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MISSOURI SECTION
COMMENTS
CIVIL PROCEDURE--STATUTORY INTERPLEADER-RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
Plaza Express Co. v. Galloway, 280 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. 1955)
Galloway was injured when his automobile collided with a vehicle
driven by a servant of the Plaza Express Company. He instituted an
action for negligence against the company and then died. The admin-
istrator of Galloway's estate was substituted as plaintiff under a Mis-
souri statute which provides for the survival of causes of action for
personal injuries when the injuries did not result in death.1 Galloway's
widow, proceeding under the Missouri wrongful death statute, brought
a separate action which could be maintained only if the injuries sus-
tained in the accident did result in death.2 Plaza Express Company
then brought an interpleader action against the administrator and
the widow to avoid possible double liability due to the fact that the
two claims were based on conflicting allegations as to the cause of
death. The Missouri Supreme Court granted the interpleader, but
held that the lower court should make a binding determination of the
cause of death before the trial of whichever negligence action was not
thus eliminated, and that the defendants had no right to a jury trial
on that issue.3
Interpleader is a remedy given to a holder of a "res, debt, or duty"
whereby two or more third persons, rival claimants thereto, may be
required to litigate their claims among themselves. 4 Traditionally, the
remedy has been an equitable one which the court would grant if four
requirements were met: (1) the same res, debt, or duty had to be the
subject of the rival claims, (2) the claims must have been derived
from a common source, (3) the stakeholder could not have any inter-
est in the subject-matter, and (4) he could not have incurred any in-
dependent liability to any of the claimants.5
In 1943 Missouri adopted the more liberal, federal-type interpleader
statute.6 Now, virtually the sole prerequisite for an interpleader ac-
tion is a showing that the stakeholder may be subject to double liabil-
1. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.020 (1949).
2. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 537.070-.090 (1949).
3. Plaza Express Co. v. Galloway, 280 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. 1955).
4. CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 66 (2d ed. 1947).
5. 4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 906-14 (5th ed. 1941). See John A.
Moore & Co. v. McConkey, 240 Mo. App. 198, 203, 203 S.W.2d 512, 514 (1947).
6. Mo. REV. STAT. § 507.060 (1949).
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ity.7 Thus, it did not matter in the principal case that the plaintiff
denied any liability whatsoever. Under the old procedure, the plaintiff
could not have interpled the defendants, and the issue of cause of
death could only have been tried in a negligence action at law.
The jury problem in the principal case arises because the Missouri
constitutional guarantee of the right to a jury trial refers to the right
as it existed at the time the constitution was adopted.8 Since there
was then no right to a jury trial in equity cases,9 there is no present
right to a jury trial in such cases. In the principal case the proceeding
took the form of an equitable bill of interpleader but was used to try
issues formerly triable only at law. In short, the issue is whether to
treat the action as equitable, with no right to a jury trial, or as legal,
with a constitutional right to a jury trial.
The problem posed by the dual aspect of the new interpleader ac-
tion was solved in this case by giving the procedural nature of the
proceeding precedence over the law issue being decided. On occasion,
a similar technique has been used in other cases, e.g., where an equita-
ble defense is pleaded to a legal action,U or where specific performance
is de manded and incidental legal relief is granted," and in such in-
stances it is said that the whole case is equitable because "affirmative
,(ittable relief" is sought.- This rationale is justification for the
denial of a jury trial, however, only in those cases where the same re-
sult could have been obtained before the law-equity merger.'3 Ex-
amples of such cases include situations where the chancellor would
grant a legal remedy as incidental relief, or where a party had the
option of merging a legal right with an equitable right and enforcing
both rights in one equity suit.
The conclusion of the court in the principal case does not seem con-
sistent with the constitutional provision for jury trial. The fact re-
mains that under the practice prior to the new interpleader statute
the defendants would have had a right to a jury trial on the sole issue
7 Buerger v. Costello, 240 Mo. App. 1194, 226 S.W.2d 610 (1949); John A.
Mooro & Co. v. McConkey, 240 Mo. App. 198, 203 S.W.2d 512 (1947).
8. Vannoy v. Swift & Co., 356 Mo. 218, 201 S.W.2d 350 (1947); Spitcaufsky
v. Hatten, .353 Mo. 94, 182 S.W.2d 86 (1944); Renshaw v. Reynolds, 317 Mo.
484, 297 S.W. 374 (1927).
9. State ex re!. Duggan v. Kirkwood, 357 Mo. 325, 338-39, 208 S.W.2d 257,
262 (1948) ; Lee v. Conran, 213 Mo. 404, 111 S.W. 1151 (1908).
lo. Withers v. Kansas City Suburban Belt R.R., 226 Mo. 373, 126 S.W. 432
(1910); Shaffer v. Detie, 191 Mo. 377,90 S.W. 131 (1905).
11. Brush v. Boyer, 104 Kan. 768, 178 Pac. 445 (1919); Hogan v. Leeper, 37
Okla. 655, 133 Pac. 190 (1913).
12. Note, 65 HARv. L. REV. 453, 455 (1952).
13. Pike & Fischer, Pleadings and Jury Rights in the New Federal Procedure,
88 U. PA. L. Rm,. 645, 654-65 (1940).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1956/iss2/9
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involved in this case. 4 The situation is analogous to the problem of
jury trial that arose with respect to the declaratory judgment statutes.
It was held in that situation that the right being adjudicated should be
determinative of the right to a jury trial.5 A new form of procedure,
it was said, should not deprive a party of a right to a jury trial where
he otherwise would have that right. So here, the plaintiff's new right
to interpleader should not destroy the defendant's right to a jury
trial," It is submitted, therefore, that the decision in the principal
case resulted in a violation of the defendants' constitutionally pro-
tected right to a jury trial.
14. See Lee v. Conran, 213 Mo. 404, 111 S.W. 1151 (1908) (In a statutory
action to quiet title the court held that the right to a jury trial depended upon
how the question of fact could have been raised before the statutory action was
created.).
15. Pacific Indemnity Co. v. McDonald, 25 F. Supp. 522 (D-. Ore. 1938), 13 So.
CALIF. L. REV. 170 (1939).
16. There may a problem as to how the jury trial will be effectuated. The pre-
1943 equitable interpleader action was a two-phased procedure. The first phase
was a determination of whether the parties should interplead based upon the four
criteria set forth in the text supported by note 5 supra. Once it was decided that
the parties should interplead, the second phase of the proceeding was to adjudicate
the dispute between the two claimants, i.e., to determine who owned the cause of
action. This was the end of the matter, however, because the plaintiff-interpleader
was a mere stakeholder and had no further interest in the subject-matter of the
suit. Under the reformed procedure, the plaintiff-interpleader may have an in-
terest in the subject-matter of the suit, as in the principal case where any liability
at all was denied, and therefore a third phase may be required. The third phasethus would be an adjudication between the owner of the cause of action and plain-
tiff-interpleader. The statutor, language gives no indication of what mechanics
should be followed in trying this third phase. It seems possible to try this issue
in one proceeding along with the first two phases, or, in the alternative, to tryit in a separate trial distinct from the determination of the first two issues. Thisproblem was recognized in the dissent in the principal case, where it was sug-
gested that "if it appears that prejudice would result to the successful party as
to that issue by proceeding to have the same jury determine liability and, if so
damages . . . a separate jury trial as to those issues [should] be had." Plaza
Express Co. v. Galloway, 280 S.W.2d 17, 27 (Mo. 1955) (dissenting opinion).
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